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Corruption and Police Legitimacy in Lahore, Pakistan  
   
Abstract 
Police legitimacy is an important topic of criminological research, yet it has received only 
sporadic study in societies where there is widespread police corruption, where the position of 
the police is less secure, and where social order is more tenuous. Analysing data from a 
probability sample survey of adults in Lahore, Pakistan, we examine the empirical links 
between people’s experience of police corruption, their perceptions of the fairness and 
effectiveness of the police, and their beliefs about the legitimacy of the police. Our findings 
suggest that in a context in which minimal effectiveness and integrity is yet to be established, 
police legitimacy may rest not just on the procedural fairness of officers, but also on their 









Procedural justice theory is premised on the idea that most people obey the law most of the 
time because they think it is the right thing to do, not simply because compliance is in their 
own best interests (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b). Providing a normative lens through which to 
understand how people might best be policed, procedural justice theory posits a string of 
connected empirical links between (a) the treatment people receive at the hand of criminal 
justice officials; (b) the legitimacy people confer, as a consequence, on institutions of justice 
including the police and the criminal courts; (c) the authority that these institutions can then 
command; and (d) public preparedness to obey the police, comply with the law and cooperate 
with the justice system (Tyler & Huo, 2002; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Jackson et al., 2012a; 
Hough et al., 2013a; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Tyler & Jackson, 2014).  
Legitimacy is central to procedural justice theory. Legitimacy exists in the eyes of 
citizens (a) when authorities such as the police have earned an entitlement to command from 
those they govern and (b) when they act in ways that justify existing power structures (Tyler, 
2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2009; Jackson et al., 2012a, 2012b; Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Hough et 
al., 2013a, 2013b). Legitimacy is important because it constrains power; study after study has 
shown that authorities have to act in fair and just ways if they are to be seen to be rightful 
holders of power by subordinates (Terrill, 2001; McCluskey, 2003). But legitimacy is also 
important because it reduces the tension between power-holders and subordinates (in the 
words of Coicaud (2013: 40): the same body of empirical work supports the idea that, when 
legal authorities act in procedurally just ways, the resulting legitimacy that this engenders in 
turn encourages people to cooperate with officials, defer to them in moments of crisis, obey 
the laws they enforce, and accept the state’s right to monopolize the use of force in society 
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2004, 2011b; Tyler & Jackson, 2014; Papachristos et al., 
2012; Meares & Tyler, 2014; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Bradford et al., 2014a; Jackson et al., 
2012b; Bradford, 2014; Jackson et al., 2013; Hough et al.,2013a, 2013b; Nivette, 2014; and 
Jonathan-Zamir & Weisburd, 2013).  
On this account legitimacy is a necessary – albeit not sufficient – pre-condition of 
normatively desirable or democratic forms of policing. Without the voluntary consent of the 
public, police have to turn to repressive, force-led and unjustified styles to secure public 
compliance, undermining in turn their claim to be acting on behalf of and in cooperation with 
those they police (Tyler, 2009; Schulhofer et al., 2011). Yet, the importance of legitimacy and 
procedural justice has received less attention outside liberal democratic contexts marked by 
relatively high levels of social integration and state legitimacy (Israel is an obvious and partial 
exception). This is a surprising omission given that legitimacy may in fact matter more in 
contexts in which the police have yet to achieve widespread justification of power and 
position, in which police corruption and an inability to maintain law and order remain two 
major problems, and in which democratic modes of policing have yet to develop.  
Such research as exists from the Caribbean (Reisig & Lloyd, 2009; Kochel et al., 
2013), Ghana (Tankebe, 2009, 2010) and South Africa (Bradford et al., 2014a) is broadly 
supportive of procedural justice theory. But these studies also stress the importance of police 
corruption and perceived effectiveness. On the one hand, Tankebe (2010) linked public 
experience of police corruption in Ghana to people’s beliefs that the police are ineffective, 
unfair and untrustworthy. On the other hand, Bradford et al. (2014a) linked public perceptions 
of police corruption in South Africa to people’s belief that the police are illegitimate. Building 
on this extant evidence, our goal in this paper is to (a) focus on Pakistan, (b) examine the link 
between people’s experience of police corruption and their perceptions of police legitimacy, 
and (c) assess whether instrumental concerns about effectiveness are just as important a 
predictor of police legitimacy as relational concerns about fairness. A probability sample 
survey of just over 400 adult residents of two towns in urban Lahore, Pakistan constitutes 
what is to our knowledge the first study into corruption, procedural justice and legitimacy in 
South Asia.  
Our paper proceeds as follows. We give an overview of policing in Pakistan; we 
discuss procedural justice theory; and having drawn out a series of relevant hypotheses to be 
tested in the current study, we outline the methodology and then the findings. Our concluding 
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remarks address some implications of our work for some contextually specific drivers of 
police legitimacy. 
  
Legitimacy and the rule of law in Pakistan 
Pakistan represents, in many ways, a very different context to the liberal-democratic states in 
which studies of police legitimacy have been conducted, states that (broadly speaking) have a 
history of legitimate government, and that (again broadly speaking) have criminal justice 
systems oriented toward serving their populations, or at least maintaining law and order on 
their behalf. Ruled for a long time as part of the British empire – and before that by more 
local empires and kingdoms – the role of the police (and police-like structures) in Pakistan 
was to provide in the first instance protection for the imperial regime; after that for 
administrative affairs (for example the collection of taxes); and only finally, if at all, to 
maintain law and order on behalf of the general population.  
The fundamental duty of the police was to curb rebellion. During British rule the 
maintenance of law and order via importation of a version of the British criminal justice 
system became important (Kumar and Verma, 2009), but this remained a coercive criminal 
justice system employed primarily to control the population (Imam, 2011). Various methods 
were utilised in order to ensure that the system remained beneficial for the British rulers. All 
decision-making power rested with the colonial administration; the native population was 
subject to a strict regime of inspection checks (Kumar and Verma, 2009); and any notion of 
local governance was resisted (Mohan, 2010). The police service was loyal to – and 
essentially served only – the colonial administration and was used as a tool to control and 
suppress the general population (Kumar and Verma, 2011; Griffiths, 1971). British rule was 
premised to a significant degree on a system of policing that served to both justify (since the 
native population was held to be incapable of policing itself and hence in need of external 
intervention) and maintain the supremacy of the colonial power (Arnold, 1977).  
During British rule, an independent criminal justice system with the development of 
police structures oriented toward serving the general population was simply not a relevant 
aim, and after independence in 1947 the police and criminal justice system remained 
essentially unchanged. The old colonial masters were replaced by the elites of the new-born 
country, and the police remained unsuccessful – or perhaps more correctly uninterested – in 
fulfilling any kind of service role and, often, in providing even a minimal sense of security or 
protection for ordinary people. The successful capture of the police by post-independence 
elites meant that the general population and police remained distant – something that in itself 
likely undermined police performance and weakened even further its performance (Imam, 
2011). 
Fast forward to the present day and police corruption remains a major problem. The 
sheer extent of police corruption is most keenly shown by the National Corruption Perception 
Surveys that Transparency International conduct in Pakistan. From 2002 to 2010 the public 
identified the police as the most corrupt state organization in the country (Transparency 
International-Pakistan, 2011). In 2011, 18% of the nationally representative sample reported 
having encountered the police in the past 12 months, and of those who had experienced recent 
contact, 54% said that they ‘felt compelled to pay a bribe.’1 By contrast, a greater proportion 
of people had had experience with the health department (39%) and education department 
(25%), with fewer proportions reporting having felt the need to pay a bribe (15% for the 
health department and 9% for the education department). 
It is a common observation in Pakistani society that elites are in a highly 
advantageous position vis a vis the police and other security providers. To many people this 
amounts to the belief that laws are made and enforced in order to benefit the elite rather than 
                                                 
1 In the 2009 National Corruption Perception Survey, respondents were asked why they interacted with the police. 
The most common reasons were to get a crime report, for violation of traffic laws, and to get release from a false 
arrest. More than half of the respondents who had experienced a recent interaction with the police reported having 
paid a bribe specifically to side-step traffic violations, fines for the lack of vehicle fitness, to get an initial crime 
report, or to avoid false arrest. When asked why they thought there was corruption in the police sector, the most 
common reasons expressed were ‘lack of accountability’, ‘low salaries’ and too much ‘discretionary power’. 
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the ordinary citizen (Rafique, 2004). A recent example of this is the emergence of a ‘VIP 
culture’ in response to terrorism. As a result of the greater perceived threat faced by political, 
business and media elites – and the fact that these elites have access to the kind of influence 
and connections mentioned above – such ‘VIPs’ receive far greater levels of protection from 
the police than ordinary citizens could ever hope to experience (Abbas, 2009). This 
encourages the impression that police (and other security services) exist to serve the elite 
instead of providing security to the masses (Imam, 2011), further undermining public trust in 
the ability of the police to serve all citizens equally.  
In sum, while people in Pakistan still have some sort of expectation that police will 
act to maintain order and the rule of law and order (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994; Marenin & Das, 
2000), the law itself seems to have little normative power (certainly over police officers), and 
the violation of rules seems to be commonly observed in routine encounters with the police. 
People in Pakistan seem not to feel ‘equal before the law’ or, rather, before the police. 
Citizens without the right connections risk bribery and blackmail during any interaction with 
officers (Muhammad & Conway, 2005). People often fear police and are unwilling to contact 
them because they do not expect fair and transparent treatment either in the first instance or 
during any subsequent legal process (Bashir 2011), or believe, justifiably, that they will be 
required to pay for such an experience. All of this suggests that people feel alienated from and 
distrust the police; that the police are a hindrance to – rather than a promoter of – just process 
and the rule of law; and that from the perspective of the public, not only are the police 
primarily a tool in the hands of the elites, they are also corrupt in their practices. Citizens 
seem to have a very different relationship with a police service that has not been configured to 
serve them in any meaningful way, in marked contrast with the situation in developed 
societies, where the idea that a key part of the police role is helping citizens is commonly 
accepted (albeit, of course, that police have many other roles as well, and that some citizens 
do not have this type of relationship with police).  
It is precisely these conditions that lead us to apply procedural justice theory (see 
below) in this context. Trust in the ability of the state to maintain the rule of law – and public 
justification for the monopoly on the use of force the state commands – started out low and if 
anything has been eroding in recent years (Kemal 2003, Khan, 2007). The state has proved 
itself not entirely unaware of this issue, and committees for police reform have been formed 
many times in Pakistan, in 1960-1961 Imam, 2011); 1961-62 (Suddle, 2002); 1972-73 
(Suddle, 2008), 1976; 1981-83 (Imam, 2011); 1985 (Suddle, 2002); 1989-1995 (Suddle, 
2008); and 1999-2009 (Suddle, 2008). Yet, there is very little evidence of any success. 
Against this backdrop it would hardly be surprising if, in such a situation, citizens question 
the legitimacy of the police and turn instead to alternative providers of security (Abrahams, 
2002).  
What, then, is the extent of police corruption in Pakistan (we focus in this paper on 
the capital of the Punjab Province, Lahore)? Is police corruption linked to low perceived 
police legitimacy? Is procedural justice a strong predictor of police legitimacy, like it is in 
Anglo-Saxon countries? Might effectiveness and corruption be equally – if not more – 
important, as has been found in Ghana (Tankebe, 2009, 2010)? To assess the links between 
people’s experience of corruption, beliefs about the fairness and effectiveness of the police, 
and perceptions of legitimacy, we draw upon procedural justice theory to structure our 
analysis. We also extend the framework to include the experience of power-holder corruption. 
In the next section we detail procedural justice theory and draw out appropriate hypotheses to 
be tested in the current study.  
 
Procedural justice theory and study hypotheses 
Being concerned with the legitimate use of power and authority, procedural justice theory 
states that people place great importance on the justice or fairness of authority’s behavior, 
where individuals are less interested in the effectiveness of the authority, or in the outcomes it 
provides, than in the processes by which it makes decisions and in the motivations behind its 
actions. What looms most prominently in people’s minds when assessing an authority is the 
fairness of the processes through which power is exercised, with many empirical studies 
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indicating that people are ready to forgive or discount unfavourable or unsatisfactory 
outcomes at the hands of authorities, if they believe that the processes that led to those 
outcomes were fair (Tyler, 2006b). The experience of procedural justice is, furthermore, 
linked to motive-based trust, which is a form of trust linked to assessments of motivation 
rather than performance (Tyler & Huo, 2002). 
Applied to the police, Tyler’s procedural justice model predicts that when officers 
treat people with respect and dignity, utilize neutral and fair decision-making processes, and 
allow people a voice in the interaction, those officers communicate messages of status and 
worth to the individual concerned (that they are valued and respected members of the social 
group the police represent). The exercise of authority via the application of fair process – by 
treating people in ways that are recognised to be fair, respectful and legal, and making fair 
and neutral decisions – strengthens the social bonds between individuals and authorities 
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler and Huo, 2002; Tyler, 2006a, 2011a; 
Hough, 2013). The application and experience of procedural justice demonstrates that their 
power is balanced by due process and that they are acting in accordance with values of 
legality and propriety, meaning that people are more likely to regard the police as legitimate, 
to defer to their authority, and to feel that the power they wield is justified (Sunshine & Tyler, 
2003; Tyler et al. 2010; Meares & Tyler, 2014).  
Procedural justice has been shown to be important in many contexts where people are 
required to submit to the authority and/or decisions of others, such as, for example work 
settings (e.g. Blader and Tyler 2009). People in organizations react to manager’s decisions 
more favourably, and are motivated to cooperate within and work on behalf of the 
organization, when they feel fairly treated across the kinds of criteria outlined above. But 
there are reasons to think that procedural justice maybe particularly important in the context 
of criminal justice, and especially policing. The emphasis on fairness among the policed 
seems likely to be rooted, in part, in recognition of the extent of the powers police officers 
wield. Police activity can have significant implications for those caught up in it, making the 
fairness of police activity particularly salient to them and indeed anyone with an awareness of 
what the police can, potentially, do. Moreover, officers in Pakistan as much as anywhere else 
are often acting in contexts where levels of external supervision are very low, and where the 
level of discretion allowed to them is very high. Another reason for the prioritization of 
procedural fairness may therefore be that it demonstrates that police are restrained in the use 
of the extensive powers vested in them. 
Procedural justice may thus indicate that police are not abusing their discretion. 
Although it is unlikely that many members of the public think explicitly in such terms, it does 
not seem unreasonable to suggest that when police behave in a fair manner they indicate 
(alongside the factors outlined above) that their use of power is not untrammeled but is 
constrained within a normative framework – in essence that they are not simply allowed to do 
what they want. This factor may be particularly important in a context such as Pakistan, 
where all too often police do simply do what they want, abusing the discretion allowed them 
and power available to them with little fear of reprisal. This may be another reason why 




Legitimacy is a bridging concept in procedural justice theory because it links the procedural 
fairness of authorities to relevant law-related behaviours and attitudes. While definitions vary 
widely, a key feature of many is the idea that people defer to, and cooperate with, legitimate 
authorities because they feel it is right to do so. The standard way to define legitimacy is to 
say that it exists when people feel that they have a positive obligation to abide by the rules set 
forth and enforced by a particular authority (such as the police). We might therefore say that 
the police are legitimate when citizens feel obligated to obey police directives and obey the 
laws that the police enforce. More broadly: ‘If citizens believe that legal authorities are 
legitimate, they regard them as entitled to be obeyed. In such a situation, they obey laws 
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because they regard deferring to social authorities as part of the obligations associated with 
citizenship’ (Darley et al., 2002: 43). 
But others maintain that this is a somewhat narrow concept of legitimacy (Tankebe, 
2009; Hough et al., 2010; Jackson et al., 2012a, 2012b; Bottoms & Tankebe 2012; Tyler & 
Jackson, 2014). In as much as it is granted by the individual to the institution, legitimacy 
might also be the moral justification (in the eyes of the policed) of an institution’s existence, 
function, power and activity. Normative justifiability is, in the words of Beetham (2013: xxx), 
the idea that: ‘The rules of power and its exercise conform to accepted beliefs about the 
rightful source of authority and the proper ends or purposes of power and standards in its 
exercise.’ Feeling a duty to obey the police and law may be one important aspect of police 
legitimacy, where consent and authorization motivate behaviour.  
Yet, another aspect of police legitimacy may reflect the belief that the institution has 
a moral right to power, where power is being exercised in ways that very broadly speaking 
defend and represent the values of citizens (Jackson et al., 2012a, 2012b; Tyler & Jackson, 
2013, 2014). On this account, judgements among individuals about the legitimacy of an 
institution are based on assessments of the congruence between its goals, practices and 
behaviours and their own (Hough et al., 2010; Jackson et al., 2011; Bradford et al., 2014b). 
This normative alignment (the sense that police officers are seen to have an appropriate sense 
of right and wrong in the eyes of citizens) gives the institution the moral right to power in the 
eyes of those they govern (Beetham, 1991; Bottoms & Tankebe, 2013). In turn, it may also 
motivate behaviour through a sense of value congruence and a heightened sense of social 
obligation (Jackson et al., 2012a). 
The most common strategy of prior research is to conceptualise legitimacy as a 
combination of felt obligation to obey legal authorities (operationalized through survey 
questions like: ‘People should obey the law even if it goes against what they think is right’ 
and ‘You should obey the police, even if you disagree with the reasons for the action’) and 
generalized trust and confidence (indexed by items such as: ‘On the whole Chicago police 
officers are honest’ and ‘The basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Chicago 
courts’).2 These items are typically combined into one index of legitimacy (e.g. Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2003; see also Reisig et al., 2007; Gau, 2011). According to this definition, to find an 
authority to be legitimate is to feel that it is one’s duty to obey the instructions of police 
officers and judges (one grants legal institutions the authority to dictate appropriate 
behaviour) and that those authorities have one’s best interests at heart (one believes that the 
power is being exercised in ways that are normatively justified).3  
A second approach is to treat legitimacy as multi-dimensional and statistically model 
the dimensions separately (Jackson et al., 2012a, 2012b; Tyler & Jackson, 2014; Dirikx & 
Van den Bulck, 2014; Reisig et al., 2007). This has been the approach of a series of 
comparative European studies (Jackson et al., 2011; Hough et al., 2013a, 2013b) that has 
distinguished between felt obligation to obey the police and beliefs about the morality and 
lawfulness of the police (Jackson et al., 2014). Taking the lead from this European work (as 
well as Tyler & Jackson’s, 2014, recent national study of US citizens), we ask people in 
Lahore, Pakistan about their felt obligation to obey the police and about their generalized trust 
in the police (assuming that generalized trust reflects normative alignment) and we model 
these  separately in statistical analysis. We reason that the first is authorization of power-
holders (people recognize the right to the police to dictate appropriate behavior) and that the 
second is justification of power-structures (people believe that the police wield their power in 
ways that encapsulate the interests of the public, thus making the possession and exercise of 
power morally valid).4 We examine the value of differentiating between two dimensions of 
                                                 
2 Other studies have measured legitimacy using only generalized trust indicators, removing deference, 
authorization and consent to power from the operational definition (Jonathan-Zamir & Weisburd, 2013; Tankebe, 
2009; Murphy et al., 2009). 
3 Papachristos et al. (2012) and Jackson et al. (2013) used a single index of legitimacy that included measures of 
normative alignment and lawfulness rather than measures of generalized trust.  
4 It may be preferable to address normative justifiability more directly, where police legitimacy exists in the eyes 
of citizens partly when people believe that officers have an appropriate sense of right and wrong – more 
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legitimacy in a procedural justice framework that also includes people’s experience of police 
corruption. 
 
Procedural justice and legitimacy 
In order to examine the links between beliefs about police procedural fairness and beliefs 
about police legitimacy in Lahore, we ask respondents about whether they believe police 
officers are respectful, impartial and willing to engage in dialogue with members of the 
public, and we link the answers that they give to their perceptions of the legitimacy of power-
holders. Hypotheses 1 and 2 refer to posited links between people’s perceptions of the 
procedural fairness of the police and (respectively) felt obligation to obey (H1) and 
generalized trust in the police (H2): 
 
H1: Perceptions of the procedural fairness of the police will be positively associated 
with felt obligation to obey, adjusting for the statistical effects of perceptions of 
the effectiveness of the police and experience of police corruption. 
H2: Perceptions of the procedural fairness of the police will be positively associated 
with generalized trust in the police, adjusting for the statistical effects of 
perceptions of the effectiveness of the police and experience of police corruption. 
 
Hypothesis 1 is premised on the idea that when authorities wield their authority in fair and 
just ways, this indicates to people in society that they are valued and have status, which in 
turn encourages people to identify with the group that the authority represents and internalize 
the value that it is morally just to obey the police (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b). Authorization is the 
positive recognition that an institution has the authority to determine appropriate behaviour 
within some situation (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989).  
Hypothesis 2 is based on the idea that when authorities wield their authority in fair 
and just ways, this indicates to people that those authorities have their best interests at heart. 
Motive-based trust (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 2006a; Tyler and Huo, 2002) stems from the 
notion that the trustworthiness of organisations or institutions is founded on estimates of 
character and affect – perceptions that the trustee has the best interests of the truster at heart. 
Primarily social rather than instrumental in character, motive-based trust is premised on an 
acknowledgement of shared social bonds and the communication of group inclusion and 
status.  
 
Police effectiveness and legitimacy 
In contrast to the relational nature of procedural justice, the association between perceptions 
of the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the police is generally seen as reflecting an 
instrumental motivation to legitimate the police. The idea here is that people legitimize legal 
authorities when they believe that the authorities provide safety, are a strong deterrent force, 
and are quick to catch criminals and respond to criminal events. This is an image of legitimate 
policing that centers upon risk, deterrence, efficiency and social control. Relating to the 
external promise of reducing criminal behaviour and threat, it refers to net gains regarding 
social control and credible threat (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Jackson & Sunshine, 2007; 
Jackson & Bradford, 2009; Sun et al., 2013). 
Thus far, research in Anglophone contexts shows that perceptions of effectiveness are 
less strongly associated with police legitimacy compared to perceptions of procedural 
fairness. But perceived effectiveness may be more important in quite different countries (e.g. 
Ghana, see Tankebe, 2009; and South Africa, see Bradford et al., 2014a) and more important 
for particular social groups (e.g. certain ethnic minority groups in Australia, see Murphy & 
Cherney, 2012; Sargeant et al., 2013). In a survey of 374 adult residents of Accra, Tankebe 
(2009) found that judgements of the procedural fairness and effectiveness of the police were 
equally strongly associated with generalized trust in the police. Moreover, procedural fairness 
                                                                                                                                            
specifically that they share moral values with citizens – and that officers act lawfully (Tyler & Jackson, 2013, 
2014; Jackson et al., 2014). 
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was more strongly associated with felt obligation to obey the police than perceptions of 
effectiveness, and importantly, while the statistical effect of perceived procedural fairness on 
cooperation was entirely mediated by legitimacy, perceived effectiveness still had a 
significant and substantive statistical effect on cooperation above and beyond any particular 
pathway via legitimacy.  
Tankebe subsequently speculated that the police in Ghana had yet to build the 
capacity to act effectively and secure public security. While procedural justice did seem to be 
linked to police legitimacy – and might therefore motivate normative cooperation – perceived  
effectiveness was also important in explaining variation in legitimacy and cooperation 
because the police had yet to establish a ‘minimum threshold of police effectiveness’ (ibid: 
1281) in that context, leading people to a more utilitarian, rational choice approach to consent 
to power and cooperation with the justice system. Similarly, in a nationally representative 
study of South Africa, Bradford et al. (2014a) found that compared to perceived fairness, 
perceived effectiveness was more strongly correlated with felt duty to obey the police and the 
belief that the police act morally (thus legitimating dominant power structures).  
In order to address these issues in Lahore, hypotheses 3 and 4 refer to posited links 
between people’s perceptions of the effectiveness of the police and (respectively) felt 
obligation to obey and generalized trust in the police: 
 
H3: Perceptions of the effectiveness of the police will be positively associated with 
felt obligation to obey, adjusting for the statistical effects of perceptions of the 
procedural fairness of the police and experience of police corruption. 
H4: Perceptions of the effectiveness of the police will be positively associated with 
generalized trust in the police, adjusting for the statistical effects of perceptions 
of the procedural fairness of the police and experience of police corruption. 
 
Hypothesis 3 is premised on the idea that, when authorities seem to be effective at crime-
control, people tend to internalize the value that it is morally just to obey the police. 
Authorisation may, in some sense, be premised on the perceived success of formal policing: 
people may grant the police power in exchange for social order; they may cede power and 
authority to the police in exchange for social regulation and justice; and this conferral of 
power and consent to police authority may to some degree depend upon the strength of social 
order at a local level (Jackson et al., 2012b). The police organization may garner legitimacy 
from the extent to which the establishment and reproduction of normative social order is 
strong, or more specifically from the extent that the police are effective in deterring crime and 
dealing with risk (Bradford et al., 2014c).  
Hypothesis 4 is based on the idea that when authorities are effectively deterring and 
catching criminals, this indicates to people that the authority has their best interests at heart. 
People may feel a stronger sense of identification and pride in relation to groups they feel are 
successful (Blader and Tyler, 2009) – most pertinently, groups that are effective in protecting 
their members – and may thus feel more closely aligned with group representatives, 
particularly those charged with providing such protection. Conversely, a lack of an effective 
police service may signal abandonment and exclusion to those forced to live under such 
conditions, weakening their sense that police are ‘on their side’ and share their values. 
 
Corruption and legitimacy 
Finally, we link people’s experience of police corruption to their perceptions of police 
effectiveness, fairness and legitimacy. In a recent examination of people’s experience and 
perceptions of police corruption in Ghana, Tankebe (2010) measured personal experience 
(e.g. when they had paid money to the police to overlook their unlawful behaviour), vicarious 
experience (e.g. witnessing someone paying money to the police to overlook their unlawful 
behaviour), and beliefs about the extent to which police leadership tackle and control 
corruption. He found that vicarious experience and beliefs about the control of corruption 
predicted people’s sense of the effectiveness, fairness and trustworthiness of the police.  
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 We measured people’s personal and vicarious experience of police corruption by 
asking survey respondents (a) whether they had ever paid money to a police officer or 
promised the officer a favor and (b) whether they had ever witnessed somebody paying 
money to a police officer or promising favour. Hypotheses 5 and 6 refer to posited links 
between people’s experience of police corruption and (respectively) felt obligation to obey 
and generalized trust in the police:5 
 
H5: Experience of police corruption will be positively associated with felt obligation 
to obey, adjusting for the statistical effects of perceptions of the procedural 
fairness and effectiveness of the police. 
H6: Experience of police corruption will be positively associated with generalized 
trust in the police, adjusting for the statistical effects of perceptions of the 
procedural fairness and effectiveness of the police. 
 
Hypothesis 5 is premised on the idea that corruption undermines the legitimate authority of 
the police. When the police are corrupt, one no longer feels a positive obligation to obey the 
police. The rejection of the authority of the police is the rejection of a corrupt police force: 
one does feel a social, legal, or moral tie – which involves a constraining power of a promise, 
contract, law, or sense of duty – to an institution that misuses its power for its own gain.  
Hypothesis 6 is based on the idea that corruption undermines the sense that the police 
have the best interests of citizens at heart. By taking bribes or favours in exchange for certain 
outcomes and treatment, the police no longer seem trustworthy, because they are wielding 
their power in ways that match their own material and cultural interests, not the interests of 
citizens and justice. 
 
The study 
Like prior work on procedural justice and legitimacy, we use a cross-sectional survey to 
measure key concepts. Our data come from a survey conducted in the capital of the Punjab 
Province in Pakistan. Two of the nine towns of Lahore were first picked randomly. Then, 
circles (an area with an average population of 6,000), localities (an area or neighborhood 
consisting of an average population of 1,000) and then households in each town were selected 
randomly using the 1998 census database (Pakistan Population Census Organization, 1998). 
A sample of 450 households was drawn using a multistage random sampling procedure. From 
the sampled households, either an adult male or female was interviewed depending upon their 
availability at the time of survey. Strikingly, however, 78% of our final sample was male. 
This figurematches the 2009 Transparency International survey on corruption in Pakistan. 
Their explanation is illuminating: ‘In a male dominated society, interaction with the world 
outside the home is a man’s prerogative, hence 87% of our respondents were male’ 
(Transparency International-Pakistan, 2009: 23).  
Overall, 404 interviews were conducted successfully. 46 interviewees quit during the 
interview or did not answer many questions due to shortage of time or loss of interest during 
interview. The study response rate was 90%. Our survey was planned and written in English, 
then translated into the national language of Pakistan, Urdu. Two languages are spoken 
frequently in Lahore. Urdu is spoken formally in offices and education institutes, and Punjabi 
is spoken informally in streets and localities. On the small number of occasions (26 of the 404 
interviews) when Punjabi was needed, the questionnaire was translated verbally by the 
interviewer. Socio-demographic characteristics of interviewees are described in Table 1. Note 
that there is no information on ethnicity because the vast majority of the Lahore population 
has a Punjabi background. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                 
5 It is assumed that the experience of police corruption will be negatively correlated with perceptions of the 




Police legitimacy: As mentioned above, legitimacy was conceived of as two distinct (albeit 
connected, see Jackson et al., 2014) psychological constructs. The first is felt duty to obey 
police directives. One example of a measure used is agreement or disagreement to the 
following statement: ‘You should do what the police tell you to do even when you do not 
understand.’ This aspect of legitimacy taps into the notion that an authority is legitimate when 
people recognise the authority’s right to dictate appropriate behavior (because they believe 
they should (rather than because, for example, they feel they will be sanctioned if they do 
not). The second construct is generalized trust in the police. One example of the measures 
used was agreement or disagreement to the following statement: ‘The Lahore police are 
trustworthy.’ If people feel that the authorities are sincere, benevolent, and concerned about 
their welfare, then they trust them to act in ways that benefit the people over whom they 
exercise authority. This justifies existing power structures in the eyes of the policed. For 
discussion on the meaning and measurement of police legitimacy, see Jackson et al., (2012a), 
Bottoms & Tankebe (2012) and Tyler & Jackson (2013, 2014).  
 
Perceptions of the procedural fairness of the police: To measure people’s perceptions of the 
procedural fairness of the police, we asked respondents about officers’ respectfulness, 
impartiality, and willingness to engage in dialogue. A representative measure was agreement 
or disagreement to the statement ‘The police treat everyone with respect.’ 
 
Perceptions of the effectiveness of the police: To measure people’s perceptions of the 
effectiveness of the police, we asked respondents about the ability of the police to pursue 
criminals, respond promptly to calls about crime, control violent crime and provide assistance 
to the public when such assistance is needed.  
 
Direct and indirect experience of police corruption: Finally, we asked respondents whether 
they had paid money to a police officer or promised the officer a favour (and if so, how 
often), and whether they had ever witnessed somebody pay money to a police officer or 
promise the officer a favour (and if so, how often). 
 
Statistical analysis 
Like other studies in this area we use latent variable modeling to estimate associations 
between central constructs.6 To estimate latent variables and fit measurement models we use 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) in Mplus 
version 7 (Muthén and Muthén, 2012). Models are estimated using Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML). FIML deals efficiently with missing data, under the 
assumption that missing data are Missing At Random conditional on the range of individual 




Levels of police corruption in Lahore 
Table 2 presents the overall extent of direct and indirect experience of police corruption. 
Strikingly, only a small minority of the sample reported never having either paid money to a 
police officer or promised an officer a favour to overlook their unlawful behavior (12%). A 
similarly small minority of the sample reported never having either witnessed somebody pay 
money to a police officer or having promised the officer a favour (11%). The majority of 
people reported either having ‘sometimes’ (40%) or ‘many times’ (25%) paid money or 
promised a favour to a police officer, or witnessing the same behaviour ‘sometimes’ (42%) or 
‘many times’ (36%). 
 
                                                 
6 More panel, experimental and cross-national designs are need (see respectively Bradford et al., 2014a; Mazerolle 
et al., 2013; and Hough et al., 2013a). 
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INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Perceptions of police effectiveness and fairness in Lahore 
Table 3 presents the top-line findings relating to people’s beliefs about the effectiveness of 
the police. Echoing the relatively widespread experience of police corruption, we see small 
proportions of people who agreed that the police are well trained to pursue criminals (12%), 
responded promptly to calls from the public (3%), does well at controlling violent crime 
(6%), treats everyone with respect (3%), respects people’s rights (3%), and so forth.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 4 presents people’s beliefs about police legitimacy. Compared to European 
Social Survey estimates (Hough et al., 2013a, 2013b), we see relatively low levels of 
legitimacy, with high proportions of people disagreeing that they should obey the police if 
they do not understand the reasons for their decisions (88%), that they should obey the police 
if they disagree with their decisions (91%), that the police are trustworthy (92%), that the 
police are usually honest (90%), and so forth.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Assessing the measurement models  
How well do these indicators scale? Using CFA to assess the scaling properties and 
dimensionality of the data, we assume that perceptions of the effectiveness, fairness and 
legitimacy of the police are unobservable psychological constructs; that variation in these 
unobservable psychological constructs drive variation in relevant observable indictors; and 
that the distinctiveness of these constructs can be assessed by empirically investigating the 
dimensionality of the data (for discussion of reflective measurement, see Borsboom et al., 
2003).  
Prior work has shown the distinctiveness of public perceptions of the effectiveness 
and procedural fairness of the police (Jackson et al., 2012a, 2012b; Reisig et al., 2007) and 
felt obligation and generalized trust (Reisig et al., 2007; Dirikx and Van den Bulck, 2014). 
Other work has combined felt obligation and generalized trust (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). We 
tested a four-factor model that combines felt obligation and trust into one latent construct 
(termed ‘legitimacy’), representing perceived effectiveness of the police, perceived 
procedural fairness of the police and the experience of corruption as separate latent 
constructs. We also tested a five-factor model that further distinguishes between felt 
obligation and generalized trust.  
Results from the two models are shown in Table 5. Exact and approximate fit 
statistics indicate that Model 1 (which does not distinguish between felt obligation to obey the 
police and generalized trust in the police) fits the data poorly. By contrast Model 2 (which 
differentiates between felt obligation and generalized trust) fits the data well, at least 
according to the approximate fit statistics. The standardized factor loadings for each 
measurement model in the five-factor CFA range from 0.40 to 0.81. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Modelling relations between constructs 
Figure 1 shows the results of a fitted SEM linking the latent variables via regression paths. 
Relations between constructs are specified according to prior work on procedural justice 
theory (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003) and people’s experience of police corruption (Tankebe, 
2010). Because no path between latent variables is constrained to zero, the fit is identical to 
the five-factor CFA model presented in Table 4. 
 




Moving from left to right, we find that experience of corruption is negatively 
correlated with perceptions of the effectiveness of the police (B=-0.44, p<.001) and 
perceptions of the procedural fairness of the police (B=-0.35, p<.001). People with direct and 
indirect experience of police corruption tend to think that the police are both ineffective and 
unfair. 20% of the variance in perceived police effectiveness is explained by variance in 
corruption experience. 12% of the variance in perceived police fairness is explained by 
variance in corruption experience. 
 Turning to generalized trust, 77% of the variance is explained by corruption 
experience, perceived effectiveness and perceived procedural fairness. Perceived 
effectiveness is the strongest predictor of generalized trust. Controlling for levels of 
corruption experience and perceived fairness, a one-unit increase in perceived effectiveness is 
associated with a 0.63 unit increase in the expected value of generalized trust. Controlling for 
levels of corruption experience and perceived effectiveness, a one-unit increase in perceived 
fairness is associated with a 0.34 unit increase in the expected value of generalized trust. 
Finally, police corruption is not associated with generalized trust, controlling for levels of 
perceived effectiveness and perceived fairness.  
 For felt obligation, 11% of the variance is explained by corruption experience, 
perceived effectiveness and perceived procedural fairness. By contrast to generalized trust, 
perceived fairness is the strongest predictor. Controlling for levels of corruption experience 
and perceived effectiveness, a one-unit increase in perceived fairness is associated with a 0.21 
unit increase in the expected value of felt obligation (p<.05).  Neither perceived effectiveness 
nor corruption experience is a statistically significant predictor of felt obligation. 
Finally, we estimated the indirect effects of police corruption on trust and felt 
obligation (using the INDIRECT command in MPlus 7). Put another way, we assessed the 
extent to which the experience of police corruption explains variation in felt obligation and 
generalized trust through intervening associations with perceived police effectiveness and 
perceived police fairness. The total standardized indirect effect of corruption on generalized 
trust is -0.40 (p<.001), with the majority of this flowing through perceived effectiveness (B=-
0.28, p<.001; for perceived fairness, B=-0.12, p<.05). Turning to felt obligation, corruption 
explains less variation via perceived effectiveness and perceived fairness, with the total 
standardized indirect effect of corruption on felt obligation being -0.13 (p<.01), flowing 
equally through perceived fairness (B=-0.07, p<.05) and perceived effectiveness (B=-0.06, 
p>.05).  
Thus, corruption is more strongly linked to generalized trust than it is to felt 
obligation, and most of the association seems to flow through effectiveness rather than 
through fairness. Thus, people with a lot of experience of police corruption tend not to trust 
police motives and intentions, in large part because they believe that the police are not dealing 
with crime and reducing risk. For felt obligation, the estimated effect seems to flow equally 
through effectiveness and fairness. Here, corruption is linked to felt duty to obey through the 
sense of effectiveness and the sense of fairness.  
 
Discussion 
In this paper we have presented findings from a survey of adult experiences and perceptions 
in two towns in Lahore, Pakistan. We have shown relatively widespread experience of police 
corruption, relatively low levels of perceived police effectiveness and fairness, and relatively 
low levels of what Tom Tyler (Tyler & Jackson, 2014) has called ‘popular legitimacy.’ 
Modelling corruption experience, perceived effectiveness, perceived fairness and perceived 
legitimacy, our analysis has been guided by a relational account of people’s connection to 
legal authorities. The central tenet of procedural justice theory is that, when individual police 
officers wield their power and authority in fair and just ways, this legitimizes that power and 
authority in the eyes of citizens (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b). Building on work by Tankebe (2009, 
2010) and Bradford et al. (2014a), we have sought to extend the literature by examining 
police corruption and testing key hypotheses in a new context. 
We have shown that perceptions of the procedural fairness of the police covary with 
the belief that institutions have ‘a just, fair, and valid basis of legal authority’ (in the words of 
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Papachristos et al., 2012: 417). When power-holders act according to principles of procedural 
justice, this provides the moral validity that justifies their possession of power in the eyes of 
the policed. Of particular interest was that half of the estimated indirect effect of experienced 
corruption on felt obligation to obey the police (the first dimension of perceived police 
legitimacy) was mediated through beliefs about police fairness. This finding accords with 
prior theory that predicts that people internalize the value that one should obey legal 
authorities when they believe that those legal authorities wield their power in fair ways (Tyler 
& Huo, 2002; Tyler, 2006a) and corruption is key to this sense of procedural justice.  
But we also found that perception of police effectiveness was a stronger predictor of 
generalized trust in the police than perceptions of police procedural fairness. Moreover, much 
of the estimated indirect effect of experienced corruption on generalized trust in the police 
(the second dimension of perceived police legitimacy) was mediated through beliefs about 
police effectiveness. This is consistent with the idea that people in these two towns of Lahore 
judge whether the police have their best interests at heart partly through the lens of whether 
this authority seems to be effectively policing crime and act according to the rule of law. A 
lack of an effective and honest police service seems to signal abandonment and exclusion to 
those forced to live under such conditions, thereby weakening their sense that police are ‘on 
their side’ and thus share their values.  
Overall, our findings speak to a possible boundary condition of procedural justice 
theory (cf. Tankebe, 2009; Bradford et al., 2014a) while also stressing the importance of 
police corruption in a new context. The basic social utility of police may be doubted more in 
Pakistan than it is in the US, UK and Australia. Under such conditions, people may draw 
more heavily on their assessments of the effectiveness of the police when forming their 
legitimacy judgments (Tankebe, 2010). In the US, UK and Australia the essential social 
utility of the police is often taken as a given; people’s response to perceived crime problems 
is often not to blame the public police, nor to turn to alternative providers of policing services, 
but to call for a greater level of intervention from the police (Girling et al. 2000). It may be 
that a baseline assumption of police efficacy in the US, UK and Australia opens up a greater 
space for procedural justice judgments, while at the same time dampening down variation in 
legitimacy linked to effectiveness judgments. In a context such as Pakistan this baseline sense 
of usefulness is still to be established, resulting perhaps in a comparatively greater emphasis 
on instrumental concerns about effectiveness. There may be an important parallel with Ghana, 
in which ‘…the failure of successive postcolonial governments to embark on any genuine and 
meaningful democratic reforms of the Ghana police to build strong attachments between the 
police and the citizenry’ (Tankebe, 2009: 1280).  
Importantly, police corruption was also strongly linked to police legitimacy in 
Lahore. This builds on existing evidence that pervasive corruption and inefficiency have been 
a major cause of public mistrust in the police, with national Corruption Perception Surveys 
conducted from 2002 to 2011 finding that the police are seen by member of the public as the 
most corrupt state organization in the country (Transparency International Pakistan, 2011). 
The police are often deemed as chronically corrupt, inefficient, ill equipped and loyal to 
power elites of the society (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan & Commonwealth 
Human Rights Initiative, 2010), and the government of Pakistan has intermittently tried to 
reform this institution. Against the backdrop of rising militancy in Pakistan and the role of 
police in attempting to control this phenomenon, the then-president of Pakistan Parvez 
Musharraf doubled the salaries of police officials. Modernized equipment was provided to the 
police, more women were recruited, and police training was improved. Yet, no change seems 
to have been observed in this institution. Despite all these measures, the police infrastructure 
in Pakistan is outdated and yet to meet the emerging challenges of the modernized age.  
Overall, our findings suggest that people will come to legitimize the police more fully 
in Lahore, Pakistan only when the police establish a minimal level of efficiency in controlling 
crime and responding to the needs of victims, when they operate more fully under the rule of 
law, and when they treat citizens and make decisions in ways that accord with principles of 
procedural justice. An intelligence-based policing system that is staffed by well trained and 
well equipped officers committed to high standards of integrity and accountability seems 
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indispensible in any effort to overcome the challenges Pakistani police is facing. 
Depoliticising the police may help, particularly in as much as this breaks links between police 
and various factions within the Pakistani elite. Police corruption needs to be checked through 
strict performance evaluation and a stringent and systematic system of accountability. Only 
through such reforms can police legitimacy – so crucial to crime-control and the 
administration of justice – be established and maintained. 
On a final note, the preceding text has alluded to an ailing police system in Pakistan. 
By and large, the public image and experience of the police revolves around the constable on 
the beat and, at most, up to the Station House Officer, who is in charge of the police station 
and is supposedly a focal point for redressal of public grievances. These are the officers that 
ordinary people encounter, who provide the ‘teachable moments’ (Tyler, 2011) during 
encounters with citizens, within which legitimacy is shaped, reproduced or 
undermined. These officers are themselves ordinary people, often drawn from deprived social 
backgrounds. Systemic reform of the police in Pakistan implies hitting the cultural iceberg 
that underpins the ideas, actions and beliefs of these officers: police culture, political culture, 
feudal culture, colonial culture, mafia culture, and above all the working class culture of the 
individuals entering the base of police service pyramid. The police constables are not only 
poorly paid; they also work in poorly equipped environment. So, they move from a family 
culture of poverty to a work culture of poverty, but in the process gain authoritative power, 
which is then, unsurprisingly, prone to be misused for gaining quick personal dividends, and 
prone to exploitation by other components of the cultural iceberg, which is full of a variety of 
power players with an interest in influencing police activity. Poorly paid constables and 
Station House Officers appear to be tools in the hands of powerful actors in the social and 
political systems of Pakistani society. Moreover, corruption for personal gain and corruption 
at the behest of others are linked: if they can (ab)use their authoritative power for others, why 
not to use it for themselves as well?  In order for systematic reform to have any chance of 
success, the components of the cultural icebergs upon which police officers stand will have to 
be identified, analyzed, dismantled and reshaped realistically.  
  




Abbas, H. (2009). ‘Police and law enforcement reform in Pakistan: Crucial for 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism success’, Institute for Social Policy and 
Understanding, 16. 
Abrahams, R. (2002). ‘Vigilantism, state jurisdiction and community morality: Control of 
crime and “undesirable” behaviour when the state “fails”’, in I. Pardo (Ed.), Morals of 
Legitimacy: Between Agency and System. Berghahn Books, pp.107-126. 
Arnold, D. (1977). The Congress in Tamilnad: Nationalist Politics in South India, 1919-
1937 (No. 1). Manohar. 
Bashir, H. (2011, August 22). ‘Public trust in the police’, Pakistan Today. Retrieved from 
http://www.pakistamtoday.com.pk 
Beetham, D. (1991). The Legitimation of Power. Macmillan. 
Blader, S. and Tyler, T. R. (2009). ‘Testing and expanding the group engagement model’, 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 94, 445-464. 
Borsboom, D., Mellenbergh, G. J., and Van Heerden, J. (2003). ‘The theoretical status of 
latent variables’. Psychological Review, 110, 203-219.  
Bottoms, A., and Tankebe, J. (2012). ‘Beyond procedural justice: A dialogic approach to 
legitimacy in criminal justice’, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 102, 119-
170. 
Bottoms, A. E and Tankebe, J. (2013). ‘”Voice within”: Power-holders' perspectives on 
authority and legitimacy’, in J. Tankebe and A. Liebling (eds.) Legitimacy and 
Criminal Justice: An International Exploration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bradford, B. (2014). ‘Policing and social identity: Procedural justice, inclusion, and 
cooperation between police and public’, Policing and Society, 22, 1, 22-43. 
Bradford, B., Huq A., Jackson, J. and Roberts, B. (2014a). ‘What price fairness when security 
is at stake? Police legitimacy in South Africa’, Regulation and Governance, 8, 2, 246–
268. 
Bradford, B., Murphy, K. and Jackson, J. (2014b). ‘Officers as mirrors: Policing, procedural 
justice and the (re)production of social identity’, British Journal of Criminology, 54, 4, 
527-500. 
Darley, J., Fulero, S., Haney, C., & Tyler, T. (2002). Psychological jurisprudence. In Taking 
psychology and law into the twenty-first century (pp. 35-59). Springer US. 
Dirikx, A. and Van den Bulck, J. (2014). ‘Media use and the process-based model for police 
cooperation: An integrative approach toward explaining adolescents’ intentions to 
cooperate with the police’, British Journal of Criminology, 54, 2, 344-365. 
Eck, J. E., and Rosenbaum, D. P. (1994). ‘The new police order: Effectiveness, equity, and 
efficiency in community policing’, The challenge of community policing: Testing the 
promises, California: Sage Publication, pp. 3-26.  
Gau, J. (2011). ‘The Convergent and Discriminant Validity of Procedural Justice and Police 
Legitimacy: An Empirical Test of Core Theoretical Propositions’, Journal of Criminal 
Justice, 39, 489-498. 
Girling, E., Loader, I. and Sparks, R. (2000). Crime and Social Change in Middle England: 
Questions of Order in an English Town. Routledge. 
Griffiths, P. S. (1971). To Guard my People: The History of the Indian Police. Ernest. 
Hough, M., Jackson, J. and Bradford, B. (2013a). ‘The governance of criminal justice, 
legitimacy and trust’, in Body-Gendrot, S., Lévy, R., Hough, M. Snacken, S. and 
Kerezsi, K. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of European Criminology. Routledge, pp. 243-
265. 
Hough, M., Jackson, J. and Bradford, B. (2013b). ‘Legitimacy, trust and compliance: an 
empirical test of procedural justice theory using the European Social Survey’, in 
Tankebe, J. and Liebling, A. (eds.) Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An International 
Exploration. Oxford University Press, pp. 326-352. 
Hough, M., Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Myhill, A. and Quinton, P. (2010). ‘Procedural justice, 




Human Rights Commission of Pakistan [HRCP] and Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 
[CHRI], 2010). Available 
at:http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/police_organisations_in_pa
kistan.pdf. Accessed on 06 March, 2014. 
Imam, K. (2011). ‘Police and the rule of law in Pakistan: A historical analysis’, Berkeley 
International Senior Seminar Visiting Experts Papers. 
Islam, N. (2001). ‘Democracy and governance in Pakistan's fragmented society’, 
International Journal of Public Administration, 24, 12, 1335-1355. 
Jackson, J. and Bradford, B. (2009). ‘Crime, policing and social order: On the expressive 
nature of public confidence in policing’, British Journal of Sociology, 60, 3, 493-521. 
Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Hough, M., Kuha, J., Stares, S. R., Widdop, S., Fitzgerald, R., 
Yordanova, M. and Galev, T. (2011). ‘Developing European indicators of trust in 
justice’, European Journal of Criminology, 8, 4, 267-285. 
Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Hough, M., Myhill, A., Quinton, P., and Tyler, T. R. (2012a). ‘Why 
do people comply with the law? Legitimacy and the influence of legal institutions’, 
British Journal of Criminology, 52, 6, 1051–1071.  
Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Stanko, E. A. and Hohl, K. (2012b), Just Authority? Trust in the 
Police in England and Wales. Routledge. 
Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Kuha, J. and Hough, M. (2014, forthcoming). ‘Empirical 
Legitimacy as Two Connected Psychological States’, in Meško, G. and Tankebe, J. 
(eds.), Improving Legitimacy of Criminal Justice in Emerging Democracies, London: 
Springer. 
Jackson, J., Huq, A. Z., Bradford, B., and Tyler, T. R. (2013). ‘Monopolizing force? Police  
legitimacy and public attitudes towards the acceptability of violence’, Psychology, 
Public Policy and Law, 19, 4, 479-497. 
Jackson, J. and Sunshine, J. (2007). ‘Public confidence in policing: A neo-Durkheimian 
perspective’, British Journal of Criminology, 47, 2, 214-233.  
Jonathan-Zamir, T. and Weisburd, D. (2013). ‘The Effects of Security Threats on Antecedents 
of Police Legitimacy: Findings from a Quasi-Experiment in Israel’, Journal of 
Research in Crime and Delinquency, 50, 1, 3-32. 
Kelman, H. C. and Hamilton, V. L. (1989). Crimes of Obedience, New Haven: Yale. 
Kemal, A. R. (2003). ‘Institutional change, growth, and poverty levels in Pakistan’, The 
Pakistan Development Review, 42, 4, 299-311. 
Khan, F. (2007). ‘Corruption and the decline of the state in Pakistan’, Asian Journal of 
Political Science, 15, 2, 219-247. 
Kochel, T., Parks, R. and Mastrofski, S. (2013). ‘Examining police effectiveness as a 
precursor to legitimacy and cooperation with police’, Justice Quarterly, 30, 5, 895-925. 
Kumar, T. V. and Verma, A. (2009). ‘Hegemony, discipline and control in the administration 
of police in colonial India’, Asian Journal of Criminology, 4, 1, 61-78. 
Lind, E. and Tyler, T. (1988). The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice. New York, 
Plenum Press. 
Marenin, O., and Das, D. K. (Eds.). (2000). Challenges of policing democracies: A world 
perspective. Routledge.  
Mazerolle, L., Antrobus, E., Bennett, S., and Tyler, T. R. (2013). ‘Shaping citizen perceptions 
of police legitimacy: A randomized field trial of procedural justice’, Criminology, 51, 
1, 33–63. 
McCluskey, J. D. (2003). Police Requests for Compliance: Coercive and Procedurally Just 
Tactics. LFB Scholarly Publications. 
Meares, T. L. and Tyler, T. R. (2014). Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of Procedural 
Justice, Yale Law Journal Forum (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/justice-sotomayor-and-the-jurisprudence-of-
procedural-justice. 
Mohan, J. (2010). Claiming India: French scholars and the preoccupation with India during 
the nineteenth century, Doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park. 
18 
 
Muhammad, F. and Conway, P. (2005). ‘Political culture, hegemony, and inequality before 
the law: law enforcement in Pakistan’, Policing: An International Journal of Police 
Strategies & Management, 28, 4, 631-641.  
Murphy, K. and Cherney, A. (2012). ‘Understanding cooperation with police in a diverse 
society’, British Journal of Criminology, 52, 6, 181–201.  
Muthén, B., and Muthén, L. (2012) Mplus User’s Guide. Seventh Edition. Los Angeles, CA: 
Muthén and Muthén. 
Pakistan Population Census Organization (1998). City district Lahore: Basic population and 
housing data by union councils. Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan. Available 
at: http:// www.census.gov.pk 
Papachristos, A. V., Meares, T. L., and Fagan, J. (2012). ‘Why do criminals obey the law? 
The influence of legitimacy and social networks on active gun offenders’, Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology, 102, 2, 397–440. 
Rafique, H. (2004). “It is Ideal, but can community control police in Pakistan?” Working 
Paper. 
Reisig, M. D. and Lloyd, C. (2009) 'Procedural justice, police legitimacy, and helping the 
police fight crime: Results from a survey of Jamaican adolescents', Police Quarterly, 
12, 1, 42-62. 
Reisig, M. D., Bratton, J. and Gertz, M. G. (2007). ‘The construct validity and refinement of 
process-based policing measures’, Criminal Justice and Behaviour, 34, 1005-1027.  
Rubin, D. B. (1987) Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys. New York: Wiley. 
Schulhofer, S., Tyler, T., and Huq, A. (2011), ‘American policing at a crossroads: 
Unsustainable policies and the procedural justice alternative’, Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology, 101, 2, 335–375. 
Suddle, M, S. (2008). Reforming Pakistan’s Police, International Crisis Group, Asia Report N 
157, 3-7. 
Suddle, M. S. (2002). ‘Reforming Pakistan police: An overview’, Presented at 120th 
International Senior Seminar Visiting Experts Papers. 
Sun, I. Y., Wu, Y. and Hu, R. (2013). ‘Public assessments of the police in rural and urban 
China: A theoretical extension and empirical investigation’, British Journal of 
Criminology 53, 4, 643–664. 
Sunshine, J., and Tyler, T. R. (2003). ‘The role of procedural justice and legitimacy in 
shaping public support for policing’, Law and Society Review, 37, 3, 555–589 
Tankebe, J. (2009). ”Self-help, policing, and procedural justice: Ghanian vigilantism and the 
rule of law,” Law and Society Review, 43, 245-268. 
Tankebe, J. (2010). ‘Public confidence in the police testing the effects of public experiences 
of police corruption in Ghana’, British Journal of Criminology, 50, 2, 296-319. 
Terrill, W. (2001).  Police Coercion.  El Paso, TX:  LFB Scholarly Publishing. 
Transparency International Pakistan (2002). Pakistan Corruption Report. Available at: http:// 
www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/query43.cfm#1. 
Transparency International Pakistan (2011). National Corruption Perception Survey. 
Retrieved  from www.transparency.org.pk 
Tyler, T. R. (2004). ‘Enhancing police legitimacy’, The Annals of the American Academy 
593: 84-99. 
Tyler, T. R. (2006a). Why People Obey the Law. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Tyler, T. R. (2006b). ‘Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation’, Annual 
Review of Psychology, 57, 375-400. 
Tyler, T. R. (2009). ‘Legitimacy and criminal justice: The benefits of self-regulation’, Ohio 
State Journal of Criminal Law, 7, 307–359. 
Tyler, T. R. and Huo, Y. J. (2002). Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with 
the Police and Courts.  New York: Russell-Sage Foundation. 
Tyler, T. R. and Jackson, J. (2013). ‘Future challenges in the study of legitimacy and criminal 
justice’, in Tankebe, J. and Liebling, A. (eds.) Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An 
International Exploration. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 83-104. 
19 
 
Tyler, T. R. and Jackson, J. (2014). ‘Popular legitimacy and the exercise of legal authority: 
Motivating compliance, cooperation and engagement’, Psychology, Public Policy and 










Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents 
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Table 2: Experience of police corruption 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Many times Total 
Have you ever paid money to a police officer 
or promised the officer a favour to overlook 
your unlawful behaviour (e.g. speeding, 
assault and theft)? 
49 (12%) 92 (23%) 163 (40%) 100 (25%) 404 (100%) 
Have you ever witnessed somebody pay 
money to a police officer or promised the 
officer a favour for the officer to overlook 
their unlawful behaviour (e.g. speeding, 
assault and theft)? 





















49 (12%) 40 (10%) 7 (2%) 404 
(100%) 
The police respond promptly to calls about 





18 (5%) 10 (2%) 5 (1%) 404 
(100%) 




24 (6%) 16 (4%) 7 (2%) 404 
(100%) 
The police are always able to provide the 









The police are doing well in controlling violent 
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(100%) 












23 (6%) 9 (2%) 0 (0%) 404 
(100%) 






























You should do what the police tell you to 
do even when you do not understand the 





17 (4%) 26 (6%) 3 (1%) 404 
(100%) 
You should do what the police tell you to 






11 (3%) 23 (6%) 3 (1%) 404 
(100%) 
You should do what the police tell you to 
























26 (6%) 6 (1%) 0 (0%) 404 
(100%) 













Table 5: Fit statistics for four-factor and five-factor confirmatory factor analysis models 
Model χ2 df p RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI CFI TLI  
1 Four-factors 506 113 <.0005 0.093 0.085-0.101 0.790 0.748  












                        
